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INTRODUCTION
In January of this year, the South African Parliament ratified the long-
awaited Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Bill,' which has engendered heated
controversy since its inception.2 For many, the success of the Land Reform
Bill portends the economic and political future of South Africa and is a
gauge of apartheid's vital signs. Without land, most South Africans3
would remain in the same impoverished and disenfranchised conditions
that they were in under the apartheid regime. With land, however, South
Africans have an improved chance to achieve economic equality.
1. The Land Reform Bill gives South African tenant laborers the right to apply for the
ownership and purchase of the land that they have historically cultivated and occupied. See
generally LAND REFORM (LABOUR TENANTS) BILL 1995 (on file with South African Embassy).
2. See, e.g., Labour-Tenants on Farms Threaten Mass Action Over Land Reform Bill, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB
File ("Labour-tenants on farms will take mass action if the land reform bill is not made law.");
Gumisai Mutume, South Africa-Politics: The Land Is Ours (And Ours), Inter Press Service, Sept. 1,
1995, available in WESTLAW, INTERPS Database ("The land debate is raging in South Africa.
White commercial farmers, especially right-wingers, are horrified by the implications of redistribu-
tion or restitution of their property."); South Africa: Natal Agricultural Union Appeals to Mandela to
Postpone Land Reform Bill, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 10, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File (reprinting portions of an open letter to President Mandela
from the Union in which it expresses "grave concern" about the bill's provisions that would give
land ownership rights to labor tenants); South Africa: Parliament Passes Land Reform Bill, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB
File (discussing opposition to the bill from agricultural unions and members of the Inkatha
Freedom Party, the Freedom Front, and the Democratic Party).
3. In this Comment, the term "South African" refers to those persons of the Black (see
infra this note) race-the indigenous people of South Africa. For lack of a better alternative, I
use the term "Afrikaner," a Dutch word which means African and refers to the Dutch residents
of South Africa, to denote all white residents of South Africa despite its inaccuracy and its
underinclusiveness of other white ethnic groups. I choose not to use the term "white South
African" as I believe it is a misnomer and falsely characterizes history.
The word "Black" is capitalized throughout this Comment because, like the words "Latino,"
"Asian," and "European," it refers to a distinct cultural group and not simply a racial classifica-
tion as does the word "white." See Kimberlt Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1332
n.2 (1988); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4
n.12 (1991). Furthermore, there is great significance in capitalizing the word "Black," as the act
itself imports a message of pride, conviction, and self-conceptualization.
1691
Land reform and land use have become particularly crucial issues in
light of President Mandela's promise to construct 1.5 million homes by
1999. 4  This promise has raised serious concerns about what residential
zoning regulations will guide South Africa through its period of transition
and expansion.
In many respects, South Africa faces a challenge identical to that faced
by the United States after desegregation, and, arguably, one that is more
complex: South Africa must decide not only how to enforce post-apartheid
legislation, but also how to foster economic and, consequently, racial inte-
gration. s Indeed, after nearly fifty years of apartheid,6 the mere abolition
of apartheid legislation will not result in integrated communities. Rather,
the South African government must take deliberate steps to ensure that
integration occurs, and that a nation emerges that is truly deserving of the
appellation "A New South Africa."7
This Comment argues that one way for South Africa to move toward
achieving racial residential integration is to implement residential zoning
regulations different from those promulgated by the United States when it
found itself at a similar point of departure in history. To this end, this
Comment attempts to prove that residential zoning regulations in the
4. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
§ 2.5.2 (1994) [hereinafter RDP] (identifying the construction of at least one million new homes
as one of its "key programmes" over the next five years); see also Carrie Shook, Layman Homes to
Start Building in South Africa, Bus. FIRST-COLUMBUS, Aug. 15, 1994, § 1, at 25, available in
WESTLAW, BUSFSTCOL Database. At present, 70% of the housing need in South Africa is
unmet. Id.
5. Whether racial integration is a fitting solution to poverty among Blacks in the United
States and South Africa is not resolved in all aspects in this Comment. Rather, this Comment
presents integration as a pragmatic solution to poverty from the limited standpoint that, due to
the disparity of wealth between whites and Blacks in both countries, the resulting inequitable
access to resources, and the circular redistribution of wealth that ensues from any segregative
condition, integration is one way for Blacks to obtain objectively "better" living conditions.
6. For an introduction to the history of apartheid from diverse perspectives, see generally
THE ANTI-APARTHEID READER: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST WHITE RACIST RULE IN SOUTH
AFRICA (David Mermelstein ed., 1987); LEO MARQUARD, THE STORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (1968);
RICH MKHONDO, REPORTING SOUTH AFRICA (1993); JORDAN K. NGUBANE, AN AFRICAN
EXPLAINS APARTHEID (1963); CAROL SUMMERS, FROM CIVILIZATION TO SEGREGATION (1994).
A thorough analysis of the history of apartheid and its deleterious effects is beyond the scope
of this Comment. Instead, this Comment will cursorily address the ills of the apartheid system as
they pertain to housing segregation. See infra Part II.C.
7. See, e.g., J. Kyle Keener, Glimmers of a New South Africa, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 6,
1990, Magazine, at 46; Gillian Slovo, Real Lives: When Tommorow Comes It's Six Months Since the
ANC Triumphed in South Africa. And the Honeymoon Goes On. There May Be Mutiny in the
Military. There are StiU Strikes and Land Disputes. But Now the Deadliest of Rivals Are Talking, Not
Fighting., THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 29, 1994, at 22 (comparing the "new" and "old" South
Africa).
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United States are one of the myriad causes of racial residential segregation
and a de facto cause of poverty among African Americans. Furthermore, if
employed in South Africa, these regulations could not adequately serve the
interests of South Africans or further the goals set forth in the African
National Congress's (ANC) Reconstruction and Development Programme
(the "RDP").8
Part I briefly examines the history of zoning in the United States and
explores the reasons why and the degree to which facially neutral zoning
regulations promote racial residential segregation. Part II presents a com-
parative analysis of the economic disparity between Blacks and whites in
South Africa and the United States, the political disenfranchisement of
Blacks in both countries, and the residential segregation of Blacks from
whites.
Finally, Part III proposes a progressive zoning model-centralized per-
formance zoning-that draws upon centralized planning and performance
zoning schemes. Part III then evaluates the proposal by illustrating how it
would promote integration in a rural area in the South African province of
KwaZululNatal and determining whether it will serve the goals of South
Africans as defined in the RDP, as well as comport with the South African
Constitution.' This Comment concludes that centralized performance
zoning would allow South Africans to enjoy a residentially integrated soci-
ety that the United States has yet to achieve in the thirty years since the
fall of "American apartheid." 10
8. "The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks to
mobilize all [citizens of South Africa] and [South Africa's] resources toward the final eradication of
apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future." RDP, supra note 4,
§ 1.1.1 (emphasis added).
9. The analysis in this Part is based on the interim Constitution of South Africa because
this Comment was written and edited prior to the approval of the permanent Constitution of
South Africa. However, it is unlikely that the cited provisions will be changed substantively.
10. In this Comment, the term "American apartheid" refers to the period in American
history, roughly from 1865 to 1955, during which there was de jure segregation in the United
States. For an engaging historiographical account of the desegregation movement, see TAYLOR
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1989), and RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
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I. RESIDENTIAL ZONING REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AS A
DIRECT CAUSE OF RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND A DE FACTO
CAUSE OF POVERTY AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court established zoning as a
valid exercise of local governmental power in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. II Euclid also provides the legal rationale for protective zoning-
the preservation of the quality of a residential environment. I" Certain
residential communities in the United States, however, have historically
received significantly greater protection than others, and "the color line" is
the mark of this distinction.
The Euclid Court's rationale for allowing municipalities such wide-
reaching control over what amounts to the mobility of persons outside their
jurisdictions was based on a theory of self-protection. 3 In essence, the
Court reasoned that municipalities needed greater powers in order to fend
off the problems of urbanization.14
Notwithstanding this rationale, the end result of exercising this zoning
power is to promote racial residential segregation. Zoning has this effect for
two primary reasons. First, zoning historically impeded racial residential
integration through race-based legislation.' 5  Second, zoning regulations
increase housing costs thereby fostering economic, and, ultimately, racial
exclusion.' 6 A by-product of the segregation that zoning fosters is the
perpetuation of poverty among the excluded groups. Thus, zoning is both
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that a state has the right to separate incompatible uses).
But see Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of Zoning, 43
CATH. U. L. REv. 59, 62 (1993) ("Mhe Court in Euclid, blinded us to zoning's exclusionary core
and facilitated its role as an acceptable, neutral bureaucratic power.").
12. Euclid established distinct zoning districts in land use planning-residential, commercial,
and industrial-and subcategories within each. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380-81. Presumably, residen-
tial areas are protected by being segregated from other land uses.
13. See id. at 387, 394-95. For an analysis and critique of the Court's rationale, see
Kosman, supra note 11, at 96-97.
14. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.B.
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an indirect cause of, and an inextricable link to, the perpetuation of
poverty, inequality, and, in the extreme, apartheid.
A. Zoning as a Direct Cause of Racial Residential Segregation
To understand fully how residential segregation is an inevitable conse-
quence of most residential zoning schemes in the United States, one must
first take into account the economic and political inequalities that exist
between Blacks and whites in this country and the history of zoning in the
United States. Only then does it become evident that zoning has histori-
cally impeded integration 17 by creating wealth-based enclaves. The sec-
tions that follow examine these aspects of zoning as they exist in the
American context.
1. Zoning Is Rooted in Intentional Racial Segregation
In postbellum America, residential communities were substantially
integrated." Covenants restricting racial residential integration were not
implemented until the twentieth century. 9 However, restrictive cove-
nants proliferated after the well-known Buchanan v. Warley decision invali-
17. But see Karl E. Taeuber & Alma F. Taeuber, Residential Segregation in the Twentieth-
Century South, in THE RISE OF THE GHETTO 89, 91 (John H. Bracey, Jr. et al. eds., 1971) (assert-
ing that until at least 1960, Charleston, South Carolina never had a racially segregative zoning
ordinance, thereby implying that segregation occurred through "natural conditions and desires
rather than by law"). However, the absence of exclusionary zoning in a segregated area does not
conclusively refute the notion that zoning regulations are a cause of segregation. Indeed, neutral
zoning regulations can have exclusionary effects. See infra Part I.A.3.
18. See Reginald L. Robinson, The Racial imits of the Fair Housing Act: the Intersection of
Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the Master Narrative of Black
Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69, 91 (1995); Richard C. Wade, Residential Segregation in the
Ante-bellum South, in THE RISE OF THE GHETTO, supra note 17, at 10. Integration during this
period was due largely to the fact that slavery made it efficient to have African Americans live
close to or even in the same house as whites and to keep African Americans spatially dispersed.
See John H. Bracey, Jr. et al., Introduction to THE RISE OF THE GHETTO, supra note 17, at 1, 2("After the Civil War, residential intermingling decreased, but not infrequently whites and
[B]lacks were still living in the same block, or ... whites were on one side of the street withNegroes on the other."); Wade, supra at 10. For well-documented studies of postbellum
integration and the development of urban ghettos in America's largest cities, see CONSTANCE
McLAUGHLIN GREEN, THE SECRET CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE NATION'S
CAPITAL 127 (1967); ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO,
1890-1920, at 7 (1967); OLIVIER ZUNZ, THE CHANGING FACE OF INEQUALITY: URBANIZATION,
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND IMMIGRANTS IN DETROIT, 1880-1920, at 274-375 (1982).
19. George S. Swan, The Political Economy of "American Apartheid": Shaw v. Reno, 11
COOLEY L. REV. 1, 18 (1994) (citing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF AN UNDERCLASS 36 (1993)).
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dated race-based zoning ordinances. 20  Restrictive covenants served to
segregate the areas in the United States that were previously integrated,
and to further exacerbate the segregation in those that were not,21 well
before zoning regulations were held constitutional in Euclid.2  By 1929,
sixty percent of all Americans lived in areas where zoning regulations were
a function of land use. 23
Although the Supreme Court has since held that race-based zoning
violates the Equal Protection Clause,2 4 "nonexclusionary" zoning regula-
tions have still resulted in de facto residential segregation.2 ' Nonexclu-
sionary regulations are facially neutral and based in part on economic rather
than racial exclusion in order to prevent property devaluation. However,
because America's poor have historically been disproportionately African-
American, 26 economically driven zoning regulations perpetuate residential
segregation.
The most candid example of zoning's roots in racial bias is the
"Chinese Laundry Laws" adopted by local governments in the late nine-
20. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Restrictive covenants were later invalidated by the Supreme Court.
See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
21.
Angry whites were frightened by the prospect of a loss of status from having [BIlack
neighbors. They were also fearful of a decline in the property value of their homes-a
loss engendered by their own panic .... In addition to physical intimidation, white
homeowners initiated legal steps to stop the expansion of the [B]lack ghettos. This took
two forms: (1) residential segregation ordinances and (2) covenants.., among homeown-
ers not to sell to [B]lacks.
Bracey et al., supra note 18, at 1, 3-4. For a discussion of how Jim Crow laws, restrictive
covenants, and acts of intimidation were used to expedite racial residential segregation, see
REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN
AMERICA 137-39 (1987).
One can only speculate whether the integrated communities would have endured. It is likely
that other factors, such as the tendency of ethnic communities to coagulate, would have led to
some degree of self-imposed segregation. However, exclusionary zoning practices did not leave
this occurrence to chance; rather, they seemingly helped destroy one of the most racially inte-
grated periods in the history of American housing.
22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. STEPHEN FRIEDMAN, CITY MOVES: A USER'S GUIDE TO THE WAY CITIES WORK 94
(1989). Moreover, by 1940 the overall segregation index (one representing total segregation, or
virtual apartheid, and zero being complete integration) reached .90 in most cities in the United
States. Richard H. Sander, Book Review, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 143, 145 (1994).
24. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
25. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
26. Other ethnic minorities, particularly Latinos, also represent a disproportionate number
of persons living at or below poverty level. See generally Nancy A. Denton & Douglas S. Massey,
Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69
Soc. Sci. Q. 797 passim (1988). However, to better compare the situation of African Americans
and South Africans, the plight of other ethnic minorities will not be addressed in this Comment.
teenth century.27 The policy expounded for promulgating these laws was
that the laundries, which were primarily owned and operated by Chinese
immigrants, created a fire hazard because most operated in wooden build-
ings. 28 In addition, these laws prohibited laundry owners from using their
businesses to house diseased Chinese persons. 9
The neutral language of the Chinese Laundry statute at issue in Barbier
v. Connolly0 did not amount to a Fourteenth Amendment violation under
then-existing standards of judicial review. In fact, several similarly neutral,
yet racially motivated, statutes were upheld during that period."
However, in an era plagued by popular Chinese resentment and pervasive
anti-Chinese violence, the Supreme Court could not ignore the racial
motivations behind the enactment of these laws and, thus, invalidated the
statute.
32
The Chinese Laundry Laws demonstrate how racial bias can remain
safely ensconced in legislation until a deliberate effort is made to acknowl-
edge it. Such laws also reveal how the ostensible regulation of land use can
camouflage the subtle regulation of a class of persons. 3' Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's later decision in Buchanan v. Warley34 illustrates how
courts typically view exclusionary zoning ordinances as only affecting prop-
erty rights and rarely as a tool for racial bias.
In Buchanan, an African American brought an action for the specific
performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. A local ordinance
27. See, e.g., Baibier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 27 (1885) (upholding a San Francisco ordi-
nance that limited the number of Chinese laundries and thwarted the operation of existing
laundries).
28. Id. at 27-30.
29. Id. at 28.
30. The challenged section of the statute, as characterized by the Court, "was simply a
prohibition to carry on the washing and ironing of clothes in public laundries and wash-houses,
within certain prescribed limits of the city and county, from ten o'clock at night until six o'clock
on the morning of the following day." Id.
31. See, e.g., Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1885) (upholding a statute that
restricted laundries' business hours to 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. despite substantial evidence of racial
bias). Until 1890, San Francisco had a zoning ordinance that required all persons of Chinese
descent to leave a certain San Francisco neighborhood within 60 days or face penalties. In re Lee
Sing, 43 F. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1890) (overturning the statute).
32. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
33. "The immigrant is in the fiber of zoning." SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 29
(1969).
34. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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prohibited this transaction by "mak[ing it] unlawful for any colored person
to move into and occupy as a residence... any house upon any block upon
which a greater number of houses [were] occupied.., by white people than
are occupied.., by colored people." 35
Despite its cognizance of prevailing racial prejudices,36 the Supreme
Court conspicuously avoided invalidating the ordinance on grounds of
racial discrimination, and, instead, based its decision on the right of whites
to sell property without restriction. 7  By choosing the latter rationale as
the basis of its decision, the Court tacitly approved the use of racially moti-
vated zoning ordinances.3" The Court's passive stance and political "bow-
ing out" are widely criticized as squandering an opportunity to effectuate
the eradication of change in the future of racial residential segregation.39
35. Id. at 70-71.
36. Id. at 73, 80 ("This interdiction is based wholly on color; simply that and nothing
more.... That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling of race hostility
which the law is powerless to control, and to which it must give a degree of consideration, may
be freely admitted.").
37. See id. at 78.
[Clan a white man be denied, consistently with due process of law, the right to dispose of
his property to a purchaser ... for the sole reason that the purchaser is a person of color
intending to occupy the premises as a place of residence?
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a
person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and is in
direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of
law.
Id. at 78, 82.
38. See id. at 81; see also Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentriflcation: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 745 (1993) ("The
Supreme Court specifically declined to invalidate racial zoning on equal protection grounds.");
Kosman, supra note 11, at 75 ("Rather than promoting the civil rights of 'colored' persons, the
[Buchanan] decision rested upon ... an unlawful infringement of property rights.").
39. See, e.g., Kosman, supra note 11, at 76-77.
By failing to invalidate the ordinance [at issue in Buchanan] on the social context of
exclusion, ... the Court protected only those "colored" persons who owned prop-
erty .... The Court's approach also ignored the effect that these ordinances could have
on the ability of the "colored" race to rise within a "white"-dominated society and, more
immediately, to live in more desirable neighborhoods of their towns.
Id. The Supreme Court continued its passive role in this regard even when it reaffirmed the
Buchanan decision. In addition, it passed up subsequent opportunities to establish a social norm
against race-based zoning legislation. See Dubin, supra note 38, at 750. Indeed, the Court "failed
to supply reasoning or moral suasion to the principled distinction between protective 'use' zoning
and apartheid." Id.
As a result of Buchanan, racially restrictive covenants became the
alternative measure through which to racially segregate communities.4
Indeed, the prohibition of blatantly race-based regulations provided the
impetus to draft more cleverly fashioned, racially motivated regulations. 1
Most of these new "neutral" regulations were allegedly purposed to cham-
pion property and home ownership rights. Eventually, these rights were
deemed worthy of exclusive protection. 42  Regulations enacted to main-
tain the character of a neighborhood that is already segregated are perfect
examples of this phenomenon. 43 Thus, zoning is partially rooted in racial
exclusion because of its historical foundations as exemplified by cases such
as Barbier and Buchanan and its modem application, which serves to pre-
serve the inequitable distribution of property rights.
40. Dubin, supra note 38, at 750-51. Even the United States government participated in
promoting alternative residentially segregative policies. Id. at 751. Government programs that
were allegedly for the purpose of bettering general living conditions negatively impacted the
intended beneficiaries through relocation programs in which families were uprooted from their
neighborhoods and placed in substandard housing projects so that higher cost housing could be
built. Id. at 751-56.
41.
"[Miodem" zoning ha[s] come to be viewed as an essentially neutral, bureaucratic tool
that, in its extreme form, could be used for racially- or class-based exclusionary purposes.
As a result, it [becomes] impossible to see zoning's racist and classist bedrock, and to
recognize that, at its core, zoning is an exclusionary device.
Kosman, supra note 11, at 61.
Kosman also questions the difference between the Chinese Laundry Laws and present zoning
regulations that give preferential treatment to certain property owners. See id. at 70
("[]f... particular places where only certain 'types' of people lived, such as detached dwellings,
were given preferable treatment over other types of buildings, such as apartment buildings.., the
similarities between the unlawful laundry ordinances and the modem zoning ordinances could
not be so easily put aside."); see also James J. Hartnett, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary Zoning,
and American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
89, 99 (1993) ("Despite the successful efforts of fair housing legislation to curb the most blatant
forms of housing discrimination, the isolation of the urban ghetto is perpetuated today by more
subtle discriminatory practices such as exclusionary zoning." (emphasis added)).
42. See Kosman, supra note 11, at 82-83.
43. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbomton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1972)
(upholding zoning ordinance designed to protect the allure of a small New England town despite
demonstrated exclusionary effects); see also Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massa-
chusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535,
540 (1992) (arguing that municipalities who use zoning to "preserve the character of the neigh-
borhood" are often masking a desire to preserve economic, ethnic, and racial homogeneity).
The concept of upholding the "character" of a particular neighborhood is itself suspect given
that a prevalent characteristic about most suburban areas in the United States is that they are
primarily white. See Hartnett, supra note 41, at 101.
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2. Zoning Regulations Increase Housing Costs, Thereby Pricing Out
Economically Disadvantaged Groups That Are Disproportionately
Minority
The most significant way in which facially neutral zoning regulations
perpetuate racial residential segregation is by increasing housing costs."
"By manipulating restrictions on matters such as lot size, lot width, building
size, or the number of bedrooms in multiple-family units.., a municipality
can make housing within its borders too expensive for low- and moderate-
income groups." 45  Certain regulations, particularly those enacted to con-
trol population density in a given area, have served to significantly increase
housing costs for low-income persons. Examples of such regulations are (1)
minimum lot-size regulations, (2) single-family ordinances, and (3) the ex-
clusion of apartment houses from residential classification. Moreover, the
implementation of zoning regulations is costly. Part of that cost is spread to
prospective residents, further augmenting the cost of housing in highly
zoned areas.
Requiring a minimum lot size in order to build or maintain a house in
a particular area is one of the most popular forms of zoning for population
density control. 6 However, depending on the minimum lot size that the
regulation requires, this type of zoning regulation can greatly increase the
cost of housing.47 The discretion exercised in creating such regulations is
subject to little restriction. In general, community residents determine
minimum lot sizes in a locality without input from the local government so
long as the minimum size is not so large as to constitute a taking or other-
44. Exclusionary zoning regulations "include a plethora of devices that increase the cost of
housing." Dubin, supra note 38, at 755. In addition, exclusionary zoning regulations thwart the
development of residential housing in general, and low-income housing in particular. For exam-
ple, some zoning regulations prescribe a maximum number of bathrooms or bedrooms in multi-
family units or encroach upon the development of low-income housing by requiring approval
through a public referendum. Id. at 756 n.74.
45. J. Gregory Richards, Zoningfor Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 764. Richards
argues that all zoning has direct socioeconomic implications and that zoning for direct social
control is, in most instances, accepted by the judiciary. He defines zoning for direct social con-
trol as "a zoning ordinance.., used ... when land users are authorized to live in a residential
district, or potential land users are excluded from the same, on the basis of relatively immutable
personal characteristics that are explicitly defined in the ordinance." Id. at 765.
46. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS
APPROACH FOR AMERIcAN LAND USE CONTROLS 67 (1987).
47. See id. at 141 (asserting that lot-size regulations increase housing costs significantly).
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wise violate the Constitution. 48 Thus, such regulations often go unscruti-
nized, and their effects unchallenged.
Depending on the demand for land in a particular area, requiring
persons to purchase a minimum amount of land in order to live in that area
would certainly exclude persons who are financially incapable of doing so.
In this way, minimum lot-size requirements result in market interference:
The quantity of available land parcels is artificially restricted, land becomes
scarce, and, consequently, more expensive. Alternatively, even if the price
of land remains constant, the fact that land can only be purchased "whole-
sale" precludes true price bargaining. For example, if no minimum lot-size
requirement were imposed, some persons would still opt to purchase large
plots of land, while others would buy only the space that they could afford.
Such a "free market" would recreate access to, and mobility within, areas
that have been artificially stymied by the imposition of minimum lot-size
requirements. 49
Similarly, single-family ordinances impose economic constraints, while
also reflecting moral judgments about the structure of lower income families
by those having wealth and political control. Essentially, single-family
ordinances prohibit "nontraditional" families from living in particular areas
and, thus, among "traditional" families. Nontraditional families are gener-
ally defined in zoning ordinances as families with more than two persons
unrelated by blood, adoption, or marriage living in the same household.i °
Data suggest that African Americans comprise a disproportionate number
48. See id. at 67. The litigation that has occurred over lot-size requirements offers no con-
crete indicia of what lot-size requirement would constitute a constitutional violation. Courts
have upheld ordinances requiring as much as 160 acres and invalidated ordinances requiring one
acre. Id. In some cases, lot size is dictated by the availability and cost of land derived from its
location in relation to employment opportunities. Id. at 257.
49. Minimum building-size regulations and setbacks create similar problems by artificially
dictating a minimum price for a house within an area, and not letting market conditions prevail.
50. Richards, supra note 45, at 769-70; cf. Robin M. Collin & Robert W. Collin, Are the
Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 HARV. BLAcKLETTR. J. 181, 212-13 (1991) (asserting that "[t]he
definition of family found in zoning ordinances reflects our idealized notion of family."). How-
ever, the average two-parent, two-child family's increasing difficulty in purchasing a home, cou-
pled with the constantly evolving structure of family composition (e.g., homosexual couples are
denied the right to marry and thus cannot form the legal relationship required by the statute),
bespeak the need to modernize the anachronistic definition of family to include the diverse living
arrangements and moral suasions in contemporary American society. See id. at 213 ("The reality
of the traditional family today is far removed from those families encapsulated in suburban zoning
ordinances. We are, in demographic fact, moving quickly away from the traditional family.").
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of nontraditional families and are, thus, disproportionately affected by
single family ordinances." Such regulations have an increasing
exclusionary impact as the percentage of nontraditional families rises
overall. In addition, single family ordinances create an economic
impediment because fewer unrelated persons are allowed to live together,
thereby reducing the number of salaried persons that can reside in the same
household when such persons do not together constitute a traditional
family.
The rationale driving density control regulations that work against
nontraditional families is based on the presumption that such families are
not "self-limiting," as are traditional families, and, therefore, tend to
expand in number and collectively generate congestion. Municipalities
also justify their exclusion of nontraditional families under the guise of
protecting the general welfare." However, despite plausible justifications
of promoting the general welfare, 54 "[alt its theoretical core, [a single
family zoning ordinance] balance[s] the individual's right to his property
against the 'collective' property right of the community at large."
55
51. In recent years, the African-American community has broken from the typical family
structure because of the increase in unwed mothers and an increased life expectancy, causing
elderly relatives to live together or with their children. "In terms of purchasing a house on a
large lot with a specified number of rooms, [nontraditional] households, without two people earn-
ing money, are forcefully excluded from the secure, high-quality housing of the suburbs. These
nontraditional households are likely to be female, poor, and Black." See Collin & Collin, supra
note 50, at 213 n.182.
52. See id. at 212.
53. "We try to encourage those [families] that can afford to fit our stereotypical idea of
family to reside in places where they are sheltered from 'negative' and 'corrupting' forces in our
society." Id. at 212-13. But see Swan, supra note 19, at 20 ("[Glovemment may contribute to
discrimination by permitting white neighborhoods in the path of an expanding African American
population to zone against occupancy by not allowing more than one family per house." (citing
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 80-81 & n.9 (2d ed. 1971))).
54. For example, some zoning advocates desire to segregate the races on the premise that it
would promote general societal welfare. The argument is that an economically homogeneous
society spawns independent thought, interest in national, state, and local affairs, and self-respect.
See, e.g., Robert H. Whitten, Zoning and Li ving Conditions, 13 PRoc. NAT'L CONF. CnTy PLAN.
27-28 (1921). However, while there is a strong correlation between economic homogeneity and
racial segregation, the correlation is not altogether perfect given that extreme wealth and poverty
exist within all races.
55. Kosman, supra note 11, at 86. Note that even the dichotomy of community versus
individual right is still based on the notion of membership within a greater community and,
thereby, excludes and completely ignores the rights of those who do not have the opportunity to
enter these desired communities. See id. at 87.
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Yet another kind of zoning regulation that tangibly increases housing
costs and is, by far, the most invidious, is one that excludes apartment
houses from residential classification and, instead, categorizes them as a
commercial use. The rigid distinction between commercial and residential
use limits the land space that can be used for high-density residential devel-
opment. The resulting scarcity of land space inevitably increases the cost
of housing according to simple market theory: When there is a limited
supply of a commodity-e.g., land upon which to build high-density
housing-and a corresponding great demand-e.g., numerous persons who
cannot afford to live in low-density suburban areas or purchase "median-
priced" homes within their community-the cost of that commodity will
naturally rise, allowing only the highest bidders to have access to the com-
modity.
The rationales for separating apartment houses from detached units are
all based on maintaining and promoting a quality of life that is desirable to
all persons regardless of race or economic status-low traffic, low noise, low
congestion, and sufficient air space. However, the biased protection and
exclusion fostered by this distinction are manifest.5 6 For example, if
overcrowding is a general societal concern, then it would seem logical that
apartment houses, which unquestionably cause congestion, should not be
zoned together.5 7 Unfortunately, the underlying bias in favor of detached
housing, which stems from a moral and social presumption that detached
56. Edward D. Landels, Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its legal Sanctions, 17 A.B.A.
J. 163, 165 (1931) ("If a duplex dwelling may be prohibited in one district on the grounds of
health and safety, it is embarrassing to try and justify ten story apartments in another."). The
absurdity of this double standard is compounded by the fact that, in most zoning ordinances,
apartment houses, which, by definition, shelter more persons than detached single- or two-family
homes, are allotted significantly less space than other uses. For example, the zoning ordinance
upheld in Euclid allowed the plaintiff developer to use 150 feet exclusively for single-family hous-
ing, 470 feet exclusively for two-family dwellings, and only 130 feet for the nonexclusive use by
apartment complexes. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365; see also Hartnett, supra note 41, at 98 ("[Slelf-
interested land use policies have resulted not only in the exclusion of a new generation of
modest-income families, but also the exclusion of racial minorities in particular.").
57. The Ohio Supreme Court recognized this fact in a 1925 opinion that determined the
validity of a zoning ordinance that prohibited a developer from erecting an apartment building on
his lot. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844-45 (Ohio 1925),
overruled by Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E. 2d 852, 855-56 (Ohio 1984) (noting that,
because apartment houses tend to bring more traffic and noise into an area, they should not be
built in areas already plagued by heavy traffic and high congestion).
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housing receives undeserved special protection at the expense of apartment
dwellers, causes legislatures to defy logic. 58
Finally, zoning involves excessive regulations that raise the general
costs of housing. For instance, most zoning regulations provide that uses
can be rezoned or special exceptions to the regulations can be granted.
However, the necessary approval processes and permit requirements add to
administrative and development costs, thereby increasing the eventual cost
of housing. 9
Admittedly, population density control is a valid exercise of zoning
power and a protection of property rights as they have been inequitably
established in American society. In fact, there is a surfeit of economic
justifications for exclusionary zoning that are primarily tied to property
rights6 However, while economic segregation is a large factor leading to
racial residential segregation, racism also plays a significant role in its pro-
motion.6' The exclusionary roots of zoning and the resulting residential
segregation are sufficient indicia that some facially neutral regulations are
motivated by racist ideology.62 Indeed, even the most legitimate econ-
58. Kosman, supra note 11, at 79.
59. See Hartnett, supra note 41, at 97.
60. Two prominent scholars have characterized the justifications for, and purpose of, exclu-
sionary zoning in the following manner: "[Exclusionary zoning]... essentially close[s] an entire
community to unwanted groups-typically people of low income who might put a heavy burden on
the public fisc yet at the same time contribute little to it, resulting in increased property taxes
and reduced land values throughout the community." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 1104 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
61. "The nature of zoning is such that it is difficult to disentangle its control over physical
development per se, its influence over the economic status of prospective residents, and its use to
discriminate against specific ethnic or racial groups." ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DEP'T OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENG'G,
FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 31 (1972), quoted in
EDWARD M. BERGMAN, ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: RECoNCILING WORKPLACE AND
RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN AREAS 15 (1974). Furthermore, this is suggested by the fact that white
neighborhoods in the United States are far more economically integrated than African-American
neighborhoods, which leads one to believe that economic exclusion may be one, but certainly
not the sole, motivation for residential segregation.
62. As one commentator points out, "Because government-approved, or de jure, segregation
had its genesis in theories of white supremacy, it is not surprising that de facto inequality often
followed separateness." Dubin, supra note 38, at 758. Furthermore, studies show that when
whites think of living with Blacks they envision an immediate influx of poverty into their neigh-
borhoods. Richard H. Sander, Housing Segregation and Housing Integration: The Diverging
Paths of American Cities 9 (Dec. 1, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Thus,
it is not surprising that some residential zoning regulations maintain a certain quality of housing
that is economically unfeasible for many African Americans to obtain.
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omic arguments should be challenged if they are products of racist under-
pinnings.63 Furthermore, economic arguments, aside from their merit or
legitimacy in economic terms, simply fail to address matters of racial justice,
which should be accorded higher value than abstract economic logic.
Even if one considers the earnest ideal of zoning regulations to create
and sustain economically and socially viable communities, the fact remains
that a tangible margin of de facto class-based exclusion occurs as a result of
the cultivation of suburbia. 64 Moreover, the objective of a zoning regula-
tion need not be the deliberate exclusion of low-income housing to cause
the same to occur:65 "Facially neutral local statutes can exclude vulnerable
blocs. "66
In sum, zoning promotes economic segregation through increased
housing costs67 and disproportionately affects economically disadvantaged
classes, which "as a matter of American history have tended to be dispro-
portionately [African-American]." '" However, because segregation tran-
scends all economic classes in the African-American community, it is clear
that zoning, to the extent that it increases housing costs, is not the sole
cause of residential segregation.69 Nonetheless, it is a real one.
63. For example, in a discussion on what caused whites to form a community group called
the "Neighborhood Improvement Association" in response to what they considered a "Negro
Invasion," one author notes that while loss of property value was a key concern to the whites, it
was a loss "engendered by their own panic." Bracey et al., supra note 18, at 3.
64. "mo the extent the ideal community is removed from the reality of our multiple class,
multi-ethnic urban regions, this ideal serves the purpose of perpetuating the exclusion of poor
people from housing opportunities." Collin & Collin, supra note 50, at 208.
65. Id. at 209.
66. Swan, supra note 19, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
67. From as far back as Euclid, courts have acknowledged that economic segregation was an
indubitable effect of zoning regulations. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316
(N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ("In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished
is to classify the population and segregate them according to their income or situation in life.").
But see Whitten, supra note 54, at 28 ("A reasonable segregation is normal, inevitable and desir-
able and cannot be greatly affected, one way or the other, by zoning.").
68. Swan, supra note 19, at 42; see also Collin & Collin, supra note 50, at 213 n.182.
Furthermore, 57% of all American families cannot afford a "median-priced" house in the neigh-
borhoods in which they live. Iver Peterson, Battling Barriers to Affordable Homes, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1991, at 10-3. African Americans and Latinos comprise 75% of such families. More-
over, 33% of African Americans are below the poverty level, as compared to only 9% of whites.
Id.
69. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 84-88 (suggesting that the residential segrega-
tion of African Americans is not linked to economic status because segregation exists across all
income levels).
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B. Residential Segregation as a Direct Cause of Poverty Among African
Americans
Residential segregation is one of the countless causes of urban poverty
in America. 70 Moreover, without racial residential segregation, a signifi-
cant amount of the urban poverty that plagues America today and nour-
ishes current sociological and political debate would not exist.7' The fol-
lowing discussion will show how residential segregation exacerbates social
ills such as unemployment and substandard education-both products and
sources of poverty-and culminates in a cycle of inescapable indigence.
72
For example, class-based residential segregation exacerbates social ills
by concentrating a weak tax base in a specific area, thereby creating sub-
standard educational facilities that turn out unemployable young adults. In
addition, the relocation of companies to the suburbs, in conjunction with
limited accessibility to housing in the suburbs, indirectly escalates the
unemployment rate in urban areas. 73  As a result, suburbanites generally
70. "Although exclusionary zoning practices alone did not create the racially segregated
communities we call 'urban ghettos,' such zoning practices have virtually ensured that ghetto
residents-typically [BIlack and Hispanic-will remain isolated from mostly white suburbanites."
Hartnett, supra note 41, at 98.
71. "If it were not for inner-city segregation-enforced by public policy-it is doubtful that
we would today be conducting debates about the alleged underclass, with its concentration ef-
fects." Dennis R. Judd, Segregation Forever?, NATION, Dec. 9, 1991, at 742. Of course, there are
other notable causes of poverty in the African-American community, namely unemployment and
substandard education. However, these additional causes do not diminish the very tangible effect
that residential segregation has on this community. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19,
Preface (claiming racial residential segregation is the "principal structural feature" of the perpetua-
tion of urban poverty and racial inequality in America today).
72. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 130.
Poverty, of course, is not a neutral social factor. Associated with it are other social ills
such as family instability, welfare dependency, crime, housing abandonment, and low
educational achievement. To the extent that these factors are associated with poverty,
any structural process that concentrates poverty will concentrate them as well.
Id.; see also Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 741,
741 (1991) ("Along with economically disadvantaged rural areas, the ghettos or slums of our cities
form an entrenched Third World of the United States. Levels of ghetto unemployment and
underemployment, substandard and nonexistent housing, malnutrition, health care, and educa-
tion approximate those found in many Third World countries.. .. " (footnote omitted)).
73. Hartnett, supra note 41, at 105. But see FARLEY & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 156 (stat-
ing that there is only "mixed support" for the proposition that residential segregation is a factor
in urban unemployment because the rate of unemployment among suburban African Americans
is nearly the same as that of those living in urban areas).
receive the dual benefit of living in a desirable area and having greater
employment opportunities.
Moreover, poverty creates a dearth of adequate goods and services
because impoverished neighborhoods typically cannot retain or establish a
viable business sector.74 Furthermore, political disempowerment ensues
from the spatial separation of African Americans from other racial
groups. 75 The result is that no common interests are shared, and, thus,
none of the alliances that lead to the political and, consequently, economic
advancement of other racial groups are formed. Thus, these other groups
have no vested interest in forming political alliances with the segregated
African-American community.76 As a result, all issues "cleave along
racial lines.
'77
Furthermore, residential segregation and its resulting poverty have
historically confined African Americans to urban areas in which rental
housing pervades. Upon acquiring wealth, most people seek to improve
their living conditions because better living conditions afford increased
opportunity for socioeconomic success. People usually better their living
conditions by moving into a community that is more economically pros-
perous than the one from which they departed. However, once shut out
from ownership opportunities, African Americans, who are statistically
renters of real estate rather than owners, cannot accumulate the capital
necessary for upward residential mobility.78 In fact, one commentator has
found zoning to be the root cause of residential immobility among African
Americans and an impediment to realizing the "bootstrapping" ideal that is
often suggested as the nostrum for urban poverty. 79
74. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 136.
75. But cf. FARLEY & ALLEN, supra note 21, at 155 (asserting that African-American clus-
ters temporarily increase political representation because of a general tendency of persons to vote
for members of the same race).
76. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 153-60 (stating that the residential
segregation of African Americans impedes pluralist politics).
77. Id. at 155. This holds true for all minority groups that are spatially isolated from one
another. Id. at 157.
78. Swan, supra note 19, at 27.
79. In his article advocating for invalidation of exclusionary ordinances to establish a more
"inclusionary jurisprudence," Joel Kosman recounts how his cursory inspection on the New York
City subway system of the outside neighborhoods provoked candid questions and ostensible
answers about why residential racial segregation persists in that city. "[Wihy do people living
amidst this decay not pick themselves up and leave? I found zoning to be the root of the
answer .... [Z]oning also seemed to prevent people from moving into various suburban munici-
palities by establishing certain economic and racial barriers to keep such suburbs homogenous and
affluent." Kosman, supra note 11, at 60.
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Zoning also creates homogeneity in types of housing, and, thus, eco-
nomically homogenous communities s°  "Mhrough the use of [zoning]
power.., local governments have maintained the beauty and homogeneity
of their borders at the expense of those who could not afford to surmount
the barriers erected through zoning ordinances."81  It is the existence of
racially and economically segregated areas and the subsequent formation of
urban ghettos that encapsulate economic turmoil in economically under-
privileged areas.82
Finally, spatial concentration of poverty is the most ostensible and
fatal consequence of residential segregation. Concentrated poverty" de-
velops according to a simple rationale: If overall poverty increases among
members of an excluded group, the geographic concentration of poverty in
the area in which they live increases directly." Spatial segregation pro-
vides a buffer for whites when poverty rates increase in general because a
large portion of poverty's effects is concentrated in African-American
neighborhoods to which whites have no ties or economic dependency.
85
As a result, African Americans bear the brunt of this intensified poverty,
while whites are spared from the full impact of the economic decline.s8
In sum, by fostering social ills in excluded communities and facilitating
an overall increase in concentrated poverty through residential segregation,
80. "Exclusionary zoning is the use of local zoning regulations to maintain 'enclaves of
affluence or of social homogeneity.'" Harmett, supra note 41, at 96 (quoting South Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 736 (N.J. 1975) ("Mount
Laurel 1', cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)).
81. Kosman, supra note 11, at 62.
82. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 8; see also Hartnett, supra note 41, at 98
("mhose same forces of racial discrimination that in part motivate exclusionary zoning today also
contributed to the development of the urban ghettos in the first place."). The collapse of the
Harlem Renaissance illustrates that while, in certain contexts, segregated areas can be
economically self-sustaining and even flourishing, their success is largely dictated by the economic
health of larger society, the decline of which can cause massive devastation in those areas. Id. at
116-18. This lends credence to the proverbial sentiment that "if America catches a cold, Black
folks catch the flu."
83. Concentrated poverty denotes the relation between the poverty level in a segregated
area and the degree to which that area is segregated. In essence, the more segregated an area is
the higher the level of concentrated poverty. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 118-19.
Thus, if a neighborhood is comprised of nearly all African Americans, the poverty level and the
negative effects accompanying high poverty levels will be higher and more concentrated in that
area. See id. at 119-23.
84. Id. at 217-36.
85. See id. at 127.
86. Id. at 127-30; see also Hartnett, supra note 41, at 105 ("Isolation in ghettos has caused
minority families to bear disproportionately the burden of a declining urban industrial
economy.').
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zoning has become a land-use practice that has impeded the progress of
equality between Blacks and whites in America.
II. AMERICAN APARTHEID AND ITS PROJECTION FOR SOUTH AFRICA
Because the historical oppression of South Africans is substantially
similar to that of African Americans, 7 the history of segregation and zon-
ing in the United States provides a basis for formulating a progressive zon-
ing strategy for South Africa. The legal status and rights of South Africans
under the regime of apartheid greatly resemble those of African Americans
during segregation. In addition, like South Africans, African Americans
were, and consistently remain, poorer, politically weaker, and dispropor-
tionately excluded from quality housing as a result of certain zoning regula-
tions.
By drawing comparisons between issues of racial residential segregation
in South Africa and the United States, and ultimately devising a new and
different zoning strategy, South Africa can avoid the pitfalls created in
postsegregation America and move toward achieving residential equality
and economic integration. Furthermore, comparing the United States and
South Africa can serve as a helpful guide for social change because "both
histories illustrate how the legal system has frequently operated as a tool to
oppress [B]lacks."88
Presently, residential segregation in South Africa is strikingly analo-
gous to the segregation existing in major urban areas in the United States.
This fact is disturbing evidence of America's failed efforts at integration. 9
Eighty-six percent of white suburbanites in the United States live in com-
munities that are less than 1% Black. Seventy-five percent of white
87. See generally JOHN H. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE ORI-
GINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1982); GEORGE M.
FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRI-
CAN HISTORY (1981).
88. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and
South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 775 (footnotes omit-
ted). For a comprehensive account of the role of law in both dismantling and sustaining apart-
heid over the last decade, see RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID 1980-1994 (1995).
Moreover, post-apartheid land reform schemes in South Africa might prove instructive in the
international context. See George Monbiot, Happy Landing Continuing Our Series on Land, George
Monbiot Finds That South Africa's Far-Sighted Reform Programme Offers Lessons for Governments All
over the World, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 19, 1995, at 4.
89. But cf. Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in the Segregation of Whites From
Blacks, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 23, 59 (1995) (positing that "modest declines in segregation observed
during the 1970s continued through the 1980s").
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Americans live in suburban or rural areas as compared to only 25% of
African Americans. Both in 1969 and in 1991, African Americans
dominated the populations of central cities." Thus, in comparing the
degree of residential segregation in South Africa, a country three years out
of a rigid apartheid regime, and in the United States, a country thirty years
out of de jure segregation, one finds little difference. 9'
A. A Comparison of Economic Disparity Between Blacks and Whites in
South Africa and the United States
One of the economic characteristics common to the United States and
South Africa is the continual concentration of wealth among whites in
both countries. The income differentials between Blacks and whites in
both countries offer substantial evidence of the historical and contemporary
wealth disparity. For example, since the collapse of South Africa's
apartheid regime in 1991, Afrikaners have averaged nearly six times the
annual income of South Africans. 92 When American apartheid legally
disintegrated in the early to mid-sixties, the median family income of white
families was nearly double that of African-American families.93 This gap
has hardly narrowed in the thirty years following desegregation. 94
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPU-
LATION AND HOUSING, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS, METROPOLITAN AREAS AS DEFINED BY THE
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, JUNE 30, 1993, REP. NO. 1990-CPH-S-1-1 703 (1993);
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPU-
LATION CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20, No. 200, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS:
MARCH 1969 1 (1970) [hereinafter SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1969]. At present,
fewer than one-third of whites in the United States live in central cities as opposed to over 65%
of African Americans. Id.
While the majority of South Africans live in rural areas and the majority of African Ameri-
cans live in central cities, this difference does not decrease the similarity between the historical
oppression of South Africans and African Americans. The overall poverty level of the two
groups is significantly larger than that of whites in both countries. This suggests that the relative
geographic location of an oppressed group is irrelevant if the concentration of wealth is else-
where.
91. In South Africa, over 90% of South Africans live in segregated areas. In the United
States, more than 50% of African Americans live in racially segregated areas. See MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 19, at 62-67.
92. See SOUTH AR. INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1994/95, at 493
(1995) [hereinafter RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1994/95]. This figure was estimated from a survey
undertaken by the South African Advertising Research Foundation between 1987 and 1992. Id.
93. See SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1969, supra note 90.
94. According to data taken from the most recent census, African Americans earn 60% of
the per capita income of whites. CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: MARCH 1992, at 1 (1993).
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Horrifying statistics of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment suggest
that the economic disparity between whites and South Africans, and
between whites and African Americans, is likely to persist. For example,
gross unemployment characterizes the economic history of both South
Africans and African Americans. In 1991, 23.3% of South Africans were
unemployed as compared to only 4% of Afrikaners.95 In 1969, the
unemployment rate for African Americans was approximately 20% 9 In
1993, the unemployment rate of African Americans was more than double
that of whites, totalling 14% and 6% respectively,9 and has, for the most
part, steadily increased in recent years.98
In addition, the poverty among African Americans and South Africans
is wildly inconsonant with the poverty rates of whites. For example, in
rural areas, 68% of South Africans live in poverty.99 This figure reflects a
poverty level nearly double that of South Africans in urban areas and sixty-
eight times that of Afrikaner urbanites."° Overall, there are twelve times
as many South African households living below the poverty level as there
are white households.01 Moreover, 60% of South Africans live without
electricity. Comparatively, in 1965, almost 47% of African Americans
were considered poor as compared to only 13% of whites.'02 The current
statistics from the 1991 Census show little change in the poverty ratio
between African Americans and whites.' 01
Inadequate education is certain to impede any group from achieving
wealth through peaceful means. Thus, the high illiteracy rates and low
school enrollment among South Africans provide a dismal forecast. A
1993 study conducted by the Development Bank of Southern Africa
revealed that 46% of South Africans are illiterate, and the percentage in
rural areas is substantially greater." In addition, the educational
95. RACE RELATIONS SURvEY 1994/95, supra note 92, at 487. The overall unemployment
rate in May 1994 was estimated at 30%. Id.
96. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, NEGRO POPULATION
71(1970).
97. BENNETT, supra note 94, at 9.
98. See id. at 100.
99. SOUTH AFR. INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1993/94, at 491
(1994) [hereinafter RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1993/94].
100. Only 1% of Afrikaners residing in urban areas live below the poverty level. Id.
101. See id. ("[I]n 1993 there were 95,000 African households.... and 8300 white house-
holds living below the poverty line.").
102. SELECTED CHARACTmRISTIcs: MARCH 1969, supra note 90, at 6.
103. BENNETT, supra note 94, at 2, 15. Thirty-three percent of African Americans live in
poverty as compared to only 11% of whites. Id. Currently, 3.5 times the number of African-
American families live below poverty than white families. Id.
104. RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1993/94, supra note 99, at 724.
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advancement of South Africans lags terribly behind that of whites.
According to the 1991 Census, 73.6% of the population has less than the
American equivalent of a junior high school or eighth grade education.'05
South Africans comprise an astoundingly high percentage of this total.
Moreover, in 1991, nearly four times as many Afriksners as South Africans
received certificates, degrees, or diplomas from universities in South
Africa.' °6 These numbers are particularly alarming in light of the nearly
six-to-one population ratio between Blacks and whites in South Africa.'07
Similarly, in 1965, half of the African-American males between the ages of
twenty-five and twenty-nine had completed fewer than four years of high
school. O'
Furthermore, African Americans and South Africans are significantly
disadvantaged on all basic levels in comparison to whites. This was true for
African Americans during the period right after desegregation and holds
true today. Likewise, South Africans are presently in the same transitional
period as that endured by African Americans at the end of segregation, and
are experiencing the same lingering inequalities between whites and Blacks
with no positive indication that the future will be any different unless
affirmative and innovative steps are taken.
B. A Comparison of the Political Disenfranchisement of African
Americans and South Africans
Political power is the wished-for tool of the underclass. South Afri-
cans stand a good chance of gaining considerable political power by sheer
numbers alone if the new government is steadfast in implementing democ-
racy at all levels of government. By contrast, in the United States, a self-
proclaimed democracy since its inception, the political power of African
Americans will always be limited by their minority status. As former-judge
Higginbotham aptly noted,
[p]erhaps the single most significant difference [between the United
States and South Africa] is the fact that from the inception of the
United States, whites have constituted a numerical majority and
have acquired a predominance of economic and political power....
105. See id. at 90. The survey states that 37.4% of the population has a "standard six or
higher qualification," which is equivalent to a junior high school or eighth grade education in
the United States.
106. See RAcE RELATION SURVEY 1994/95, supra note 92, at 230.
107. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
108. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1969, supra note 90, at 2, 10.
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Because of the secure political and economic power, and numerical
dominance, of whites in the United States, accommodation of the
legitimate demands of [B]lacks would not result in a substantial
diminution of their power.' 9
This "minority/majority inverse" between Blacks in South Africa and in
the United States creates a crucial distinction in their similar histories and
future solutions. "
In South Africa, whites risk a near total loss of power and wealth if the
interests of the majority are put first. Recent statistics fortify this assertion:
The total population of South Africa as of 1993 was roughly 40
million,"' of which South Africans comprised 76% (30.7 million), while
whites comprised a mere 13% (5.2 million). Thus, any post-apartheid
political disenfranchisement of South Africans would develop at an
economic and, then only by default, racial level because South Africans
have the immeasurable advantage of being the majority in a democratic
society.
In sum, bridging the economic gap between Blacks and whites in
South Africa will, in many respects, be more difficult than in the United
States because of the inordinate economic disparity between Blacks and
whites in South Africa. Moreover, creating an informed and active elector-
ate will be a significant challenge given the pervasive lack of education
among the South African citizenry.1
2
C. A Comparison of the Historical Legal Oppression of African
Americans and South Africans and Their Residential Segregation from
Whites
Part of the problem of understanding apartheid is that many
persons do not comprehend its pervasiveness and crushing venality.
109. Higginbotham et al., supra note 88, at 775 (footnotes omitted).
110. The President's Council report published in August 1992 relays this prediction. RACE
RELATiONS SuRvEY 1993/94, supra note 92, at 94-95. Another study forecasts an estimated
increase of more than twenty million South Africans in residential urban areas over the next four
years. See id. at 95.
111. RACE RELATIONS SURvEY 1994/95, supra note 92, at 4-5. This figure and all popula-
tion statistics for South Africa in this Comment were determined by adding the population esti-
mate of the Urban Foundation, which updated the estimate from the 1991 census but did not
include population statistics from the 10 "independent" homelands in South Africa, and the
estimate provided by the Development Bank of Southern Africa in 1991 of the population of
those excluded areas. See id.
112. See supra Part II.A.
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Apartheid affects all aspects of a [B]lack person's life. Under apart-
heid laws, [B]lacks have no right to equal or integrated housing; no
right to freedom of movement, assembly or association; no right to
equal political representation; and no right to equal or integrated
education. 113
Under apartheid, housing segregation existed on two fronts. First,
territorial residential segregation relegated South Africans to rural areas
encompassing only thirteen percent of the country." 4  This isolation
inevitably created a severe housing shortage for South Africans. Second,
urban residential segregation designated certain pockets for South Africans
within the "white only" areas." 5 A web of intricate segregative sub-
policies existed under the rubric of urban residential segregation such as
homelands, group areas, and influx control. These policies regulated land
division and segregation within business and residential districts, and the
mobility of South Africans between racially designated areas." 6
The primary legislative acts that made this structured residential segre-
gation possible were the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, and the infamous
Group Areas Act enacted in 1950. The South African parliament passed
the Land Acts mainly in response to disgruntled Afrikaners desiring segre-
gation. As a result of the Land Acts' enactment, droves of South Africans
were brutally ejected from their homes, limited to roughly half the land
they previously occupied, and prohibited from purchasing land outside of
the areas designated to them under the Acts." 7 Before 1913, there were
few legal limitations on South Africans' right to purchase property."'
However, the 1950 Group Areas Act ordered the establishment of racially
segregated residential areas for nonwhites living in white areas, with its
ultimate goal being the absolute segregation of all ethnic groups across
business and residential lines." 9 Moreover, the Group Areas Act specifi-
113. Higginbotham et al., supra note 88, at 778 (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. The paucity of the amount of land allotted South Africans is particularly striking
given that South Africans comprise at least 67% of the population. By contrast, whites occupied
87% of the land, though they comprised no more than 13% of the population. Id. at 779 n.60.
115. Id. at 778.
116. Id. at 779.
117. See FRANcES KENDALL & LEON Louw, AFTER APARTHEID: THE SOLUTION FOR
SOUTH AFRIcA 36 (1987). For an in-depth historical account of these forced removals and the
legislative policies undergirding them, see generally ELAINE UNTERHALTER, FORCED REMOVALS:
THE DIVISION, SEGREGATION AND CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA (1987).
118. See MURIEL HORRELL, THE GROUP AREAS ACT: ITS EFFECT ON HUMAN BEINGS 25
(1956).
119. Higginbotham et al., supra note 88, at 787.
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cally regulated interracial property transactions: Persons were prohibited
from owning property outside their designated area.120
Very calculated rationales went into devising these regulations, as is
evidenced by a statement of the former Prime Minister during parlia-
mentary debates:
If we could succeed just to this extent in keeping the Native popula-
tion in the reserves-and getting them to live there, . . . -if we
could achieve that measure of separation, then ... white South
Africa will be saved. 121
In essence, the goal of governing Afrikaners was to remove South Africans
from all aspects of life except the provision of cheap labor. 122 During the
latter years of apartheid, the people of South Africa directly challenged
many of these policies in court and through various protest movements, but
largely to no avail. " In more recent years, integration has slowly occur-
red through the migration of South Africans into white areas, precipitated
by the decreased enforcement of the Group Areas Act when South Africa
came under international scrutiny. However, the greatest change occurred
120. Id. The Group Areas Act was to function as a catchall component to the 1913 and
1936 Land Acts by providing for residential segregation on all levels that the Land Acts had
missed. Id. at 787 n.96; see also HORRELL, supra note 118, at 27-28. It was also impossible for
South Africans to "marry into" another area. For example, the Group Areas Act held that a
white marrying a South African was considered a South African for the purposes of the Group
Areas Act. R. v. George, 1954(2) S.A. 243, 246 (N).
121. Higginbotham et al., supra note 88, at 780 n.62 (quoting Dr. H. F. Verwoed, Minister of
Native Affairs).
122. Id. at 781 n.69.
123. Id. at 782; see also Mpangele v. Botha, 1982(3) S.A. 633 (C) (action enjoining the en-
actment of a statute by Parliament which, if granted, would impose additional procedural limita-
tions on the process of granting homelands independence); Mustapha v. Receiver of Revenue,
Lichtenburg, 1958(3) S.A. 343 (A.D.) (challenging the 1936 Land Act which prohibited South
Africans from owning land and non-Africans from living in "African" areas). In both cases the
courts upheld the segregative acts of urban residential and territorial segregation. Higginbotham
et al., supra note 88, at 785. By contrast, the Group Areas Act has never been directly chal-
lenged.
There has been mixed success, however, in challenging forced removals. Compare Cathi
Albertyn, Forced Removals and the Law: The Magopa Case, 2 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 91 (1986)
(describing the Magopa tribe's successful challenge to forced removals) with M.G. Cowling, Forced
Removals in KwaZulu: From Bad to Worse, 6 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 303 (1990) (discussirg the
retention of legislation that would allow forced removals in KwaZulu/Natal).
For a general background of the history of popular resistance and protest against apartheid
legislation, see ABEL, supra note 88; WILLIAM COBBETT & ROBIN COHEN, POPULAR STRUGGLES
IN SOUTH AFRICA (1988); EARL DENMAN, THE FIERCEST FIGHT: A DOCUMENTED ACCOUNT OF
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA (1985); THOMAS KARIS &
GWENDOLYN M. CARTER, FROM PROTEST TO CHALLENGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
AFRICAN POLmCS (1972-77).
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in 1991 when the South African parliament repealed the Group Areas Act
and passed the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (the "Act"),
marking the end of apartheid. 2 4  Presently, the Act provides for the
reallocation of undeveloped rural and government-owned land tenured
under apartheid legislation.
Despite these very significant victories in the history of South Afri-
cans, residential integration has not materialized, nor is it expected in the
near future.125  Institutionalized segregation was challenged more success-
fully in the United States.2 6  In fact, several policies and programs aimed
at fostering integration arose out of the litigation brought by African Amer-
icans against segregation and its progeny.' 7 Although many of the chal-
lenged laws were enacted through local governments and were thus pri-
marily supported by politically empowered local communities, the United
States federal government also expressly promoted racial segregation at a
national level by denying minorities access to federally subsidized housing
in white areas and demanding that white suburbs have racially restrictive
covenants before they could receive such funding.2 8  As a result, a very
124. Proposed amendments to the Act are still awaiting passage by Parliament. If passed, the
amendments will serve to include land in urban areas seized from South Africans under the 1966
Group Areas Act, extend the statute of limitations for filing land restitution claims, and permit
investigation into privately owned land procured under apartheid legislation. RACE RELATIONS
SURVEY 1993/94, supra note 99, at 326.
125. Id. at 344. Furthermore, a 1992 survey conducted by The Estate Agent, a South African
news publication, exposed the "negligible" increase in South Africans purchasing homes in white
areas since the repeal of the Act. Id.
126. "The 1960s mark a crucial turning point in race relations. Old policies were challenged
and replaced by new policies that eventually produced modest declines in segregation." Farley &
Frey, supra note 89, at 26.
However the comparative success of the civil rights movement in ending residential segrega-
tion should not be misconstrued as an easy battle:
In the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy vowed to end racial discrimination in
housing with the "stroke of a pen," but civil rights groups pressured him for almost two
years before he issued a timid Executive Order banning discrimination, but exempting all
existing housing and all new housing except that built or directly financed by the Federal
Government.
Id. at 26. Furthermore, the enactment of the heralded Fair Housing Law of 1968 was in many
respects an effort to mollify the outrage of African Americans over the murder of the foremost
civil rights leader of that time, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. See id. For a critical analysis of the
extent to which civil rights laws have triumphed over racial oppression in the United States, see
generally Crenshaw, supra note 3.
127. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1995), the Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1995), and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12
U.S.C. § 2906 (1995) are among the most notable of these achievements.
128. Between 1930 and 1950, the U.S. government provided mortgage insurance for three
out every five homes purchased in America. Prospective mortgagors were required to use the
subsidy for property in racially segregated areas and areas of low minority presence based on the
small percentage of the homes purchased under this program were pur-
chased by minorities. In sum, South Africans were systematically and
legally denied the right to integrated housing whereas African Americans
were initially precluded by law and later by de facto segregation resulting
from lawful regulations.
The future of integration in both countries is uncertain. Even in the
face of declining residential segregation "the racial attitudes of whites may
limit integration" in America." 9 For example, most whites in the United
States oppose integration altogether, or will tolerate it only if the integrat-
ing African Americans have the same socioeconomic status as such whites
and will constitute a numerical minority in the neighborhood. 30 The
result of this scenario is that, in the United States, the migration of a small
yet significant number of African Americans to smaller metropolitan areas
in which whites are a solid majority may be the window to integration since
whites will not fear becoming a minority in the residential area. In fact,
sociologists tracing decennial patterns in residential segregation predict
such a migration is the future trajectory of integration in the United
States. 3 ' In South Africa, however, a more immediate solution is neces-
sary in order to avoid the perpetuation of racial residential segregation
through zoning.
III. CENTRALIZED PERFORMANCE ZONING AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
ACHIEVING RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION
Surveys predict that by the year 2010, at least 69% of South Africans
will live in urban areas while only 31% will live in rural areas. How this
geographical shift in composition will occur is unknown, and it is unlikely
to occur without affirmative steps toward economically integrating Black
and white residential communities in South Africa. In the interim, South
Africa must plan its urban landscape cautiously and intelligently in order to
extinguish the burning embers of apartheid. South Africa must learn from
the United States' failure to achieve racial residential integration through
theory that the presence of minorities substantially lowered property values. In addition, mort-
gagees in the private sector adopted the government's lending policy, thereby making it nearly
impossible for minorities to purchase homes in nonminority areas. See Beth J. Lief & Susan
Goering, The Implementation of the Federal Mandate for Fair Housing, in DIVIDED NEIGHBOR-
HOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 228-29 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987).
129. Farley & Frey, supra note 89, at 40.
130. Sander, supra note 62, at 9.
131. Denton & Massey, supra note 26, at 1-14; Farley & Frey, supra note 89, at 41.
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traditional zoning strategies. As evidenced by the use of facially neutral,
yet discriminatory, zoning regulations in a racially and economically
divided postsegregation United States, certain zoning regulations will only
serve to perpetuate racial divisions. Thus, new zoning strategies are sorely
needed.
One of the primary objectives of any zoning scheme adopted by South
Africa should be economic integration, which inevitably results in some
degree of racial integration."' With this objective in mind, I propose
and evaluate centralized performance zoning as a viable scheme for residen-
tial zoning in South Africa. I demonstrate the feasibility of this scheme by
illustrating its hypothetical application in the South African province of
KwaZululNatal. Finally, I assess the extent to which centralized perfor-
mance zoning comports with the South African Constitution and the RDP.
A. What Is Centralized Performance Zoning?
In order to understand centralized performance zoning, one must have
at least a synoptic understanding of performance zoning and how it differs
from traditional zoning schemes. Performance zoning is a method of regulat-
ing land use that does not distinctly segregate uses, but, rather, relies on a
developer's compliance with performance standards in order to avoid nui-
sance. It offers a comprehensive and dynamic scheme for land use plan-
ning. In fact, the absence of rigid land use districts is the principal factor
distinguishing performance from traditional zoning. Furthermore, perfor-
mance zoning's elasticity allows for case-specific evaluations, consistent
determinations, and agile responses to fluctuating market conditions. 33
These unique aspects of performance zoning serve to further differenti-
ate performance from traditional zoning because of their theoretical and
practical ability to produce a more integrated environment. For example,
to the extent that exclusionary zoning regulations and, consequently, resi-
dential segregation are products of intentional exclusion,'34 the use of
objective standards that are based on measurable environmental conditions
is likely to produce zoning regulations with a less exclusionary effect.
132. It is important to note that the degree of racial integration sought in the United States
must be carefully chosen so as to avoid diluting the clustered political power of African Ameri-
cans. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (discussing how the numerical minority
status of African Americans limit their political power in the United States).
133. DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZoNING: How IT WORKS (1988).
134. See supra Part I.A.1.
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Furthermore, to the extent that segregation of certain land uses dispa-
rately affects the economically underprivileged, 3 ' performance zoning's
pliant or nonexistent-use districts remedy this impact. Moreover, the
objectivity that undergirds performance zoning allows for easier monitoring
of intentional exclusion as well as increased accountability of zoning
authorities.136
Performance zoning works by setting forth criteria known as perfor-
mance standards that embody objectively desirable characteristics of a
community,'37 and then requiring developers to meet these standards
before developing a given area. 31 Specifically, developers must submit a
plan demonstrating how their proposed project will meet the performance
standards of a particular municipality. Performance standards are the
muscle of performance zoning and, to the extent that they are enforced, the
governing precepts of land use. Typical performance standards regulate
traffic generation, noise, lighting levels, drainage, wildlife or vegetation
preservation, and architecture. 139
When applied specifically to residential zoning, performance standards
could include density, lot sizes, setbacks, and most other traditional residen-
tial zoning concepts."' ° However, when these traditional concepts are
united with performance zoning they are adopted for practicality, not exclu-
sionary purposes, and are based on objectively measurable standards. 4'
135. For example, the exclusion of multifamily dwellings from suburban residential areas has
disproportionate adverse effects on African Americans. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying
text.
To be sure, South Africans suffering from the most extreme poverty in the country will still
be disproportionately disadvantaged by the any use of traditional zoning tools such as density and
lot-size restrictions. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. However, this does not diminish
the utility of performance zoning for the majority of South Africans. See infra notes 162-169 and
accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
137. This idea is analogous to the concept of "general welfare" in the traditional zoning
schemes. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 25-29 (2d ed.
1994).
138. See PORTER ET AL., supra note 133, at 11.
139. Id.
140. Performance standards for planned unit developments have even more detailed density
regulations such as floor area, open space, livable space, recreation space, and parking. Id.
141.
A standard is stated in objectively measurable terms if it will consistently yield the same
result regardless of when or by whom the standard is applied. An example of a standard
stated in objectively measurable terms is one that forbids noise emissions over a certain
decibel level between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. An example of a standard that is not
stated in objectively measurable terms is one that forbids "all offensive noise."
Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363, 395 (1991).
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Thus, a minimum lot-size criterion would likely be based on spatial neces-
sity rather than on creating aesthetically homogenous communities. Most
importantly, performance zoning can function to directly promote integra-
tionary goals by requiring proponents of new developments to provide
desirable and affordable housing for all segments of the population.'42
Centrazed performance zoning is performance zoning under a federal
regulatory hegemony. Pliant, yet definite, criteria for performance
standards are set at the federal level, but provinces and local governments
can add community-specific criteria' so long as they accord with federal
policy.'" Furthermore, the standards directly address potential nuisances
and segregation. In other words, centralized performance zoning addresses
the effects and not the causes of nuisance as well as segregation, thereby
effectively combatting both harms.145
Although performance zoning typically eschews the notion of
exclusive-use districts, it is possible to direct similar uses into separate areas
and still engage in performance zoning. This sort of "combination zoning"
was championed by a well-known planner, Lane Kendig. Kendig's zoning
scheme allows for eight distinct land use districts.'"6 However, unlike
most traditional zoning schemes that impose either exclusive-use districts or
a tiered-use pattern, Kendig's paradigm establishes use districts that are
nonexclusive. Because South Africa already has segregated land-use cores
in its urban areas, Kendig's approach may be more adaptable than an unre-
stricted elastic zoning scheme such as pure performance zoning.
B. Applying Centralized Performance Zoning in the KwaZululNatal
Province
This section demonstrates how centralized performance zoning would
hypothetically function in a rural area of the South African province
KwaZulufNatal by examining how a new housing development would come
to fruition under this scheme. The following analysis tests the overall
142. See infra notes 150-158 and accompanying text.
143. Provincial governments in South Africa are comparable to state governments in the
United States.
144. The American analogue to this scheme is the State Zoning Enabling Act through which
states are charged with zoning power in accordance with the general welfare of their citizens.
145. This approach of regulating effects, and not causes, has received some criticism. See
Acker, supra note 141, at 375 (commenting that performance standards are ineffective at mini-
mizing nuisance costs because they regulate uses and not nuisance costs).
146. LANE KENDI ET AL., PERFORMANCE ZONING 299-305 (1980).
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utility and efficiency of implementing centralized performance zoning to
promote economic and, consequently, racial integration.'47
KwaZulu/Natal is comprised of six subregions and the self-governing
territory of KwaZulu 4' s As is the case in all South African provinces,
most white KwaZulu/Natal residents live in urban areas while Blacks make
up the overwhelming majority in the rural regions. Residential segregation
in KwaZulu/Natal is longstanding and extreme,' 49 mirroring the disparity
in living conditions between Blacks and whites in that region.
Consequently, white integration into Black areas will not occur unless
substantial incentives are given to both developers and potential inte-
grators. Thus, in order to promote economic integration and new develop-
ment in a peri-urban area of KwaZulu[Natal the following performance
standards should be adopted:'50
(1) Maximum density standards'5' must be no lower than that
necessary to maintain objectively safe and healthy living conditions
147. South Africa consists of nine provinces. I based my hypothetical in KwaZulu/Natal, as
opposed to one of South Africa's other eight provinces, because KwaZuuNatal is characterized
by some of the starkest socioeconomic contrasts between Blacks and whites in South Africa
today. For a detailed history of the political and economic structure in South Africa's Black
homelands, with a particular focus on the Kwazulu region, see generally BUTLER ET AL., THE
BLACK HOMELANDS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1977). Furthermore, KwaZululNatal houses the largest
percentage of South Africa's total population-approximately one-fifth-of which 83% is Black.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF S. AR., SOUTH AFRICA'S NINE PROVINCES: A HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
PROFILE 18, 23, 63-65 (1994).
148. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF S. APR., supra note 147, at 65.
149. For a brief history of the development of residential housing for South Africans in Natal
under the apartheid regime, see generally PAULINE MORRIS, A HISTORY OF BLACK HOUSING IN
SOUTH AFRICA 8-9 (1981). See also LEO KUPER ET AL., DURBAN: A STUDY IN RACIAL
ECOLOGY 143-74 (1958) (discussing voluntary and compulsory racial residential segregation in
Durban, Natal).
150. For an overview of the format of flexible zoning ordinances in the United States, see
PORTER Er AL., supra note 133, at 19.
151.
One of the principal performance measures employed in flexible zoning is density of
development....
Density concepts in flexible zoning differ from those in conventional zoning by
their reliance on broad measures of density rather than restrictions on lot size, setbacks,
and other tediously detailed regulations of lots and buildings. In this sense, the concept
of density is employed as a fundamental indicator of performance rather than translated
into requirements reflecting certain preconceived arrangements of lots and buildings.
Id. at 28. For example, minimum lot size can be no larger than the number or fraction of acres
that the average South African can afford based on the median national per capita income.
Alternatively, minimum lot-size regulations could be completely eliminated and replaced with
floor/area and open-space ratios. This more flexible standard would allow for autonomous
decision-making regarding lot size without forfeiting the benefits of overall density regulations.
See id. at 60.
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given the total population size and mean national per capita
income.' 52
(2) Twenty percent of all new housing must be leased or sold to
persons who previously lived in historically white areas and intend to
inhabit the premises. Alternatively, if the housing is built in an area
that is more than twenty percent white, it must be affordable to the
average South African based on the mean national per capita
income. 153
(3) Buffer zones"s4 may serve to remedy nuisances and to allow for
the coexistence of otherwise incompatible uses.
(4) Other objectively measurable criteria should regulate conditions
such as noise, traffic, construction, and drainage.
Accordingly, a developer seeking to purchase and develop land in a
rural area in KwaZululNatal would present to a local planning board a
detailed plan that explicitly demonstrates how its proposed housing devel-
opment meets the performance standards listed above. Performance stan-
dard (1) requires the developer to adhere to a preset minimum lot size.
Adherence can be easily and objectively verified by checking the antici-
pated footage of each housing plot. The developer can meet performance
standard (2) by creating small, low cost, mid-quality housing for average
income South Africans (those earning the national mean per capita
income), and building larger, more extravagant houses for whites that are
cheaper than houses in urban areas in order to encourage white integration.
Finally, compliance with performance standards (3) and (4) will be governed
by community-specific criteria and will be easy for a local planning board to
verify because that agency would have been responsible for developing the
criteria in light of the natural geological environment, local population size,
152. In sum, all density regulations operate such that one community's desire to. create or
maintain a low-noise, low-traffic environment will not result in the formation of rural or urban
clusters with less stringent regulations, thereby reducing the overall quality of life for urban or
rural residents. Thus, as the general population expands and contracts so will the general density
guidelines set forth at the national government level. As a result, no single community will be
subjected to substandard living conditions at the expense of another.
153. These percentages can be adjusted according to the index of economic integration
desired by the South African government and the extent to which that index is a function of
racial residential integration.
154. Buffer zones, also known as buffer yards, are landscaped areas positioned between land
with otherwise incompatible uses. For example, if a factory that emits offensive fumes desires to
locate in a predominantly residential area, its developers would have to submit a development
plan that demonstrated that the factory would be sufficiently enveloped by buffer zones to meet
the performance standard that regulated emission levels. See generally PORTER ET AL., supra note
133, at 43-49.
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and overall planning goals. Thus, the local planning board will know first-
hand what development goals conform to its performance standards.
After the local planning board verifies that the developer's plan meets
performance standards, the board will draft a brief explanatory report about
how the plan coincides with the overall criteria, and, in particular, the
community-specific standards of that locality. Finally, the board will sub-
mit the report to the provincial planning agency for final approval. The
provincial planning agency's role will be to expediently and independently
evaluate the plan's feasibility, and to strictly enforce the overarching policy
considerations of centralized performance zoning. Construction of the new
development can begin only after receiving such final approval from the
provincial planning agency. This second step in the regulatory process is
necessary to monitor implementation of the goals of the RDP. 5
Under such a scheme, residential segregation is treated as a nuisance
and is centrally regulated. The unfortunate drawback of this proposal is
that the disparity in the quality of housing between Blacks and whites will
still exist, although to a lesser degree. For example, complying with perfor-
mance standard (2) will require developers to build housing that is both
affordable to the majority of the area's residents as well as desirable for
persons of all economic classes. Thus, whites will benefit from the incen-
tives that developers will be forced to create for them in order to encourage
integration. As one commentator has suggested, "the crux of the matter is
that ... persons must be attracted to their new areas.""56 Furthermore,
members of South Africa's underclass will still be left on the fringe because
their income, if existent at all, will still be significantly below the per capita
average. The only alternative is a forced redistribution of wealth-an
option that has already been considered and rejected by the present govern-
ment.
15 7
On the other hand, this scheme will solve some of the immediate
problems surrounding residential segregation by placing the burden of inte-
gration on private developers who themselves have an incentive to develop
housing in South Africa due to the great demand for affordable housing and
the government's dedication to ensuring that all of its citizens have access
to affordable housing. 5 The ultimate costs will likely be born by the
government, which will have to provide sufficient incentives to private
155. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
156. KUPER ET AL., supra note 149, at 174.
157. See RDP, supra note 4, § 2.4.
158. See Coenie de Villiers, Director-General's Message, 1 LAND INFO (Dept. of Land Affairs,
Pretoria, S. AFT., Sept. 1994, at 3, 3-4).
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developers to enter South Africa's fertile housing market. Post-apartheid
coverage of housing development in South Africa suggests that developers
of all types are flocking to South Africa to benefit from the boon that a
newly opened market provides. 59  Integration is likely to ensue because
integrated housing will be virtually inevasible in new housing developments
if centralized performance zoning is consistently enforced, and whites as
well as upper class Blacks receive effective incentives.
Centralized performance zoning encourages development by making
plan approval more predictable and streamlining the regulatory process.
Finally, centralized performance zoning encourages white influx into Black
areas allowing many South Africans both to remain in the areas in which
they presently reside and have developed community ties, and to gain
access to resources that heretofore have only been available in white urban
areas.
By the same token, if no affirmative steps are taken to ensure inte-
gration, it could potentially occur in twenty to thirty years upon the emer-
gence of a significant Black middle class. However, the United States
provides the best case study from which to draw the conclusion that inte-
gration would still be unlikely to occur without prompting, given that in
spite of a comparatively well-established African-American middle class,
residential segregation persists in the United States. In addition, the
emergence of a significant Black middle class in South Africa is somewhat
dubious, if not altogether unthinkable, without taking deliberate efforts to
economically empower South Africans. Thus, the South African govern-
ment should initiate economic integration through progressive legislation
such as centralized performance zoning, rather than passively waiting for a
substantial Black middle class to evolve.
C. The Pros and Cons of Centralized Performance Zoning in South
Africa
Centralized performance zoning is an imperfect solution to racial resi-
dential segregation because of the myriad interests it must serve across
political, economic, and social levels. Even by enforcing uniform criteria
such as maximum minimum lot sizes, South Africans on the fringe of the
economy will still be unable to purchase land in certain areas because the
159. See, e.g., U.S. HOUSING TRADE MISSION TO VISIT SOUTH AFRICA, REUTER EUROPEAN
BUSINESS REPORT, July 11, 1994 ("The U.S. government announced today that it would sponsor
a mission for American businesses to explore opportunities for investment and trade in the hous-
ing and construction industry in South Africa." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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concentrated wealth among whites skews the average per capita income,
thereby raising the maximum minimum lot-size requirement. 1' ° Depend-
ing on how change is envisioned in South Africa, this drawback can be
detrimental. In essence, those persons situated at the extreme polarities on
the economic spectrum are unlikely to be greatly affected by the implemen-
tation of centralized performance zoning. However, in light of the radical
change that needs to take place in South Africa, a centralized tool is neces-
sary to establish equality even if a small percentage of South African citi-
zens will remain unaffected.
In addition, the centralized performance zoning scheme proposed in
this Comment allows South Africa to maintain land-use districts-areas in
which a particular land use dominates. Some critics deem any maintenance
of use districts inconsistent with the concept of performance zoning on the
ground that use districts do not serve to prevent nuisance. 6' Although
this contention has merit, it is not altogether convincing because the non-
exclusivity of the uses still captures the essence of performance zoning and
furthers the goal of flexibility. Furthermore, obliterating use districts from a
zoning scheme may prove too unconventional for the South African gov-
ernment to adopt at this protracted stage of political negotiation. Thus, in
practical terms, enforcing nonexclusive use districts would be the better.
approach.
A final potential drawback is that a presumptive degree of rigidity
attaches to any scheme that involves centralized control. In the context of
centralized performance zoning, such control could conceivably compromise
performance zoning's integral advantage of flexibility over traditional zon-
ing. However, the flexibility of performance zoning lies in its goal of non-
segregation, and its focus on regulating the effects rather than the causes of
nuisance. These aspects of performance zoning foster innovative land use
and development within definitive parameters that sustain, rather than
decrease, flexibility. Indeed, local land use agencies operating within the
rubric of centralized performance zoning would not be accorded the power
to grant variances, or any similar discretionary powers that tend to lessen
the rigidity of traditional zoning. Nevertheless, the inherent flexibility of
performance zoning obviates the need for such authority.
The potential benefits to South Africans offered by centralized perfor-
mance zoning are manifold. First, a centralized plan gives rise to effective
160. A more controversial strategy would be to set all the performance standards on the
economic and social interests of South Africans. However, because South Africa is striving for a
nonracial politic, it is unlikely that it would embrace such a proposition.
161. Acker, supra note 141, at 379.
1724 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1689 (1996)
procedural safeguards because it reduces the number of regulatory agencies
involved and thus diminishes the opportunity for corruption and politick-
ing. This is an important consideration given that a key procedural safe-
guard is an impartial decision-maker.'62 In fact, impartiality is central to
the strength of all other procedural safeguards,163 and vital to determining
the validity of land-use regulations in light of the pervasive bias in that
domain.'"
Land use is particularly vulnerable to procedural bias because the
decision-making power rests mainly with local governments. The localized
nature of zoning makes it ripe for conflict largely due to the decision-
makers' inevitable familiarity with local issues and predilection toward
particular positions. 6 In South Africa, maintaining a localized decision-
making process could be unfavorable to South Africans because whites have
come to occupy a significant portion of valuable land under apartheid, and
have the economic strength and, possibly, the political muscle to create
legislation preserving the status quo.'66 Indeed, as former-Judge
Higginbotham has noted, "[a] meaningful constitutional revision without
an enlightened racially pluralistic judiciary committed to equality of oppor-
tunity for all South Africans will not assure.., even the limited protection
against housing segregation that some [B]lack Americans have
received." 1 67
Furthermore, procedural issues arise mainly in the context of accepting
or revising an established zoning ordinance. However, as noted earlier,
because centralized performance zoning is so flexible, reasons for seeking
variances will usually not exist." Also, having a centralized zoning
scheme will encourage the influx of capital by creating a single regulatory
agency and minimizing the bureaucratic red tape of local governments.
Finally, and most importantly, performance zoning eliminates rigid exclu-
162. See Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D.
L. REV. 161, 161 (1989) ("Biased decisionmakers not only threaten accurate decisions, but also
undermine the legitimacy of governmental processes.").
163. Id. at 161-62.
164. Id. at 162.
165. Id.
166. Although the potential iniquity of autonomous local rule may seem counterbalanced by
the majority presence of Blacks in South Africa, the hurdle remains of creating and maintaining
an informed and politically active Black electorate.
167. Higginbotham et al., supra note 88, at 770.
168. See Acker, supra note 141, at 374. Generally, the performance standards are based on
the requirements necessary to prevent a particular harm, and, thus, any use that does not
conform under such flexible standards probably does not belong in that area.
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sive use districts that serve to segregate "society's least advantaged
members."169
No matter how innovative the scheme, however, improved zoning
controls will not by themselves lead to economically integrated communi-
ties in South Africa. Legislation comparable to Title VIII of the United
States Civil Rights Act of 1968170 should be adopted as part of any cen-
tralized scheme for land use and redistribution. In light of the struggle
waged by African Americans to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to
include Title VIII, South Africans should not have to vigorously fight to
demonstrate the need for such legislation. Moreover, Title VIII is very
relevant in the South African context because it was promulgated for the
direct purpose of ending, or at least minimizing, racial residential segrega-
tion.171
South Africa should adopt centralized performance zoning because
performance zoning greatly increases the potential for economic integration
even if property values in a given area are high. Under such a zoning
scheme, an excessive minimum lot standard will not further restrict con-
sumers from purchasing land. Rather, nationally determined performance
standards will limit minimum lot sizes by requiring that the maximum
minimum lot size be proportionate to the amount of land affordable to the
average citizen of South Africa based on the mean national per capita
169. See id. at 378.
170. Title VIII reads in relevant part that, "it shall be unlawful... [t]o refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or other-
wise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race [or] color ...."
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994). Preceding sections of Title VIII limit the legislation's scope of en-
forcement and protect certain property rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1994) (exempting the sale or
rental of a single-family home or the rental of rooms or units in a dwelling of no more than four
families by its owner who (1) owns three houses or less concurrently, (2) does not employ the
services of a broker to assist with the sale or rental, (3) does not use discriminatory advertising as
defined in § 3604(c), and (4) if not residing on the premises, conducts such a transaction no more
than once a year).
In addition to enforcing nondiscriminatory behavior in sales and rentals by individuals, Title
VIII has served to invalidate certain land-use mechanisms that promoted discrimination. See
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding Philadelphia's procras-
tination in the development of low-income housing was discriminatory under Title VIII), cert.
denied sub nom., Whitman Area Improvement Council v. Resident Advisory Bd., 435 U.S. 908
(1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding
under Title VIII that town could not incorporate for the deliberate objective of enacting zoning
legislation that would prohibit the construction of low-income housing); United States v. Yonkers
Bd. of Education, 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that city policy that
relegated low-income housing construction to minority communities violated Title VIII).
171. See Hartnett, supra note 41, at 93.
1726 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1689 (1996)
1727
income. Objective health criteria would determine the minimum lot size.
Thus, exclusive use districts in South Africa would cease to exist.
The nonexclusionary feature of performance zoning and its objective
performance standards are the aspects of performance zoning that will bene-
fit South Africans the most because they allow a majority of the populace
to have access to all residential areas and require economic, and by exten-
sion, racial integration. The premise is that, if a wealthy minority is inter-
spersed in poor majority communities, the mere presence of those minority
members will serve to upgrade the services and living conditions in that
area. However, it is the centralized construction of performance zoning
that will ensure its success and guarantee conformity.
D. The Extent to Which Centralized Performance Zoning Comports with
the RDP and the South African Constitution
South Africa needs a centralized zoning scheme to effectuate the tran-
sition to a racially and economically integrated society. The disparity,
oppression, poverty, powerlessness, and lack of education among South
Africans are extreme, thereby warranting, if not mandating, that an ex-
treme measure be taken. By implementing centralized performance zoning,
the South African government will be fulfilling the objectives of the ANC
Reconstruction and Development Programme ("RDP"), and taking its
canons to their logical conclusion.17 Furthermore, centralized perform-
ance zoning seems to accord with the South African Constitution.
1. Centralized Performance Zoning and the RDP
The general goals of the RDP are to develop an integrated and sus-
tainable program through a people-driven process, to safeguard national
peace and security, to build a strong nation, to jointly reconstruct and
develop communities, and to implement democracy in South Africa.1
7 3
Centralized performance zoning satisfies each of these goals.
Due to its inherent flexibility, centralized performance zoning allows
for coordinated policies throughout South Africa in the area of housing
development and land use that can withstand the expansion of the country
in its effort to continue to supply 1.5 million homes over the next three
172. "[Zloning should seek to promote urban development patterns consistent with RDP
objectives." RDP, supra note 4, § 2.5.11.
173. Id. § 1.3.
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years and beyond. In addition, this flexibility would enable South Africans
to determine their own land uses subject only to "general welfare" guide-
lines, as opposed to fixed regulations that prohibit certain land uses in
particular areas, thereby fostering a people-driven process.
A centralized scheme of any sort could serve to unify a citizenry,
thereby promoting national peace and security by instilling national values
and highlighting common objectives. By slowly eradicating racial residen-
tial segregation in conjunction with other national land reform and redistri-
bution policies, centralized performance zoning will eliminate the spatial
dimension of apartheid, and establish a viable nation with less economic
disparity. Furthermore, centralized performance zoning facilitates develop-
ment because its flexibility and uniformity can link reconstruction and
development. Finally, although the centralized focus of the proposed
scheme lends itself to socialist ideology, implementing such a scheme can
help "democratize" South Africa by setting a standard of equal access to
resources, which is a fundamental feature of democracy.
2. Centralized Performance Zoning and the South African Constitution
The Parliament in South Africa has unlimited legislative authority
subject to the provisions of the Constitution.'74 The Constitution
nowhere excludes a policy of centralized land use or implies that such a
policy would be beyond the scope of powers vested in the Parliament. In
fact, the provincial legislative authority includes the regulation of matters
that, "to be performed effectively, require[] . . . regulat[ion] or co-
ordinat[ion] by uniform norms or standards that apply generally throughout
the Republic."' 75  Centralized performance zoning certainly qualifies
under this definition.
Furthermore, the South African Parliament specifically regulates the
restitution of land rights, which is in the same realm as land use and plan-
ning.' 76  The fact that the provincial legislature can participate in
174. S. AFR. INTERIM CoNST. ch. 4, cl. 37, reads in relevant part:
Legislative Authority of Republic
37. The legislative authority of the Republic shall, subject to this Constitution, vest in
Parliament which shall have the power to make laws for the Republic in accordance with
this Constitution.
175. Id. ch. 9, cl. 125.
176. Id. ch. 8, cl. 121, subsec. 1 ("An Act of Parliament shall provide for matters relating to
the restitution of land rights, as envisaged in this section and in sections 122 and 123."). The
remainder of this section of the Constitution suggests that the land restitution is a national,
centralized scheme. See id. ch. 8.
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national policymaking does not diminish Parliament's overarching supre-
macy because an act of Parliament prevails over a provincial law if the act
applies uniformly throughout the Nation."' Moreover, the South African
Constitution affords provincial governments less authority than the United
States Constitution affords to states. Thus, while a centralized legislative
scheme, such as centralized performance zoning, might raise issues of
federalism under the United States Constitution, if the performance
standards employed serve to directly benefit one racial group and not the
others, centralized performance zoning probably would not violate the
principles of federalism outlined in the South African Constitution.
78
Finally, centralized performance zoning would seem to invoke equal
protection analysis under the United States Constitution. The South
African Constitution offers similar protection in its chapter on Fundamen-
tal Rights: "Every person shall have the right of equality before the law and
to equal protection of the law."' 79 However, if South Africa is to establish
equality on various levels among its citizenry, the equal protection doctrine
cannot serve to impede redistribution of rights and resources. Indeed,
"resources spent on individuals must be equalized, forcing either a diminu-
tion of [social and economic] rights for those who already have them, or an
increase of these rights for those who have been denied them.""lW None-
theless, the outcome of an equal protection challenge to centralized perfor-
mance zoning remains unclear in light of the dearth of post-apartheid equal
protection jurisprudence in South Africa. Hopefully, courts would find that
centralized performance zoning legislation passes constitutional muster
because it clearly comports with the goals of the RDP.
177. Id. ch. 9, cl. 126, subsec. 4.
178. As one commentator explains, "South Africa's new constitution... does give South
Africa a federal structure-but one in which the power of the component states, or rather 'prov-
inces,' is decidedly more limited than the authority of the states which make up the United
States of America." Stephen Ellmann, The New South African Constitution and Ethnic Division, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 5, 21 (1994). See Bertus de Villiers, Federalism in South Africa:
Implications for Individual and Minority Protection, 9 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 373 (1993), for an inter-
esting examination of federalism in general and how it should function in South Africa.
179. S. AFR. INTERIM. CONST. ch. 3, cl. 8, subsec. 1 (emphasis added). The Constitution
further provides that "no person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly," on
the basis of "race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture or language." Id. cl. 8, subsec. 2.
180. Randal S. Jeffrey, Social and Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Legal Con-
sequences and Practical Considerations, 27 COLum. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 45 (1993) (footnote
omitted).
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CONCLUSION
I think one of the things America has to address very, very squarely
is whether or not we can live with continued vast spatial separations
between the poorest of our populations, concentrated in public
housing and central cities, and the vast differences that exist across
our urban geography to the suburbs, which are essentially white.''
South Africans will have to address a similar issue when implementing
the new Land Reform Bill and voting on land issues in local government
elections. Finding itself at a point of departure similar to the position of
the United States after desegregation, South Africa will hopefully choose a
path that will benefit those deprived for too long of their equitable share,
and thus surpass the United States in its efforts toward residential integra-
tion. 18 2
Whether centralized performance zoning will prove useful to South
Africans depends largely on what additional measures the South African
government takes to establish and ensure long term economic equality and
integration. In addition to any legislation that promotes economic integra-
tion, South Africans must be able to acquire the educational and financial
means to elevate their socioeconomic status. 8 3 Adopting centralized per-
formance zoning as a deliberate effort to avoid the course of the United
States will mean that the residential segregation of African Americans and
its injurious effects were not borne in vain if they inform the creation of a
"New South Africa."
181. This Week with David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 11, 1993) (quoting Henry
Cisneros, United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development).
182. It seems that South Africa is already doing so in the sphere of affirmative action, which
may ultimately impact land acquisition and housing. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1790 (1993). Professor Harris notes:
The South African concept of affirmative action expands the application of affirmative
action to a much broader domain than has typically been envisioned in the United
States. That is, [the people of South Africa] consider affirmative action a strategic mea-
sure to address directly the distribution of property and power, with particular regard to
the maldistribution of land and the need for housing.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
183. South Africans must gain access to these essentials in addition to having their basic
needs met. See Phillip Van Niekerk, The Road Ahead: Handing Back the Land Is Only the Begin-
ning, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 22, 1994, at 21 ("[South Africa's] land reform programme
will only be successful if there's a package of support offered to people .... I'm talking of water,
electricity, housing and clinics." (quoting Derek Hanekom, Minister of Land Affairs and Head of
the ANC Land Commission)).
